by Andrea Tucci,
Since Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) seized power in Syria in December 2024, it has been unable to provide either order or protection. Minorities Druze, Alawites, and Christians feel abandoned, if not directly threatened.
We already saw it in March, with the massacre of hundreds of Alawites. Now it’s the Druze. Who will be next? Religious leaders call for calm, but the reality is different: has the sectarian war, which many hoped was a closed chapter, returned?
In Jaramana, a village on the outskirts of the capital, fragile identities coexist. Here, the Druze community has long tried to maintain a delicate balance between loyalty and autonomy. Now, local leaders accuse the government of failure.
Today, Syria is a forgotten battlefield, still the stage for quiet but strategic maneuvering. On one side, there’s an increasingly assertive Russian presence with airbases in Tartus and Latakia. On the other, in Sweida, a full-fledged Israeli military operation has taken place. Helicopters from the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) delivered weapons and ammunition, and transporting wounded Druze fighters directly into Israeli territory.
These two episodes reveal a broader, more troubling picture: Syria is becoming the stage for an increasingly overt rivalry between Moscow and Tel Aviv. The long-standing”marriage” of convenience between Putin and Netanyahu rests on a fragile balance: Moscow allows Israel to strike Iranian targets and Shiite militias in Syria, as long as Russian bases are left untouched, in addition is strongly reasserting its presence because Israel is attempting to position itself as a “protector” of the Druze.
Indeed, Israeli helicopters in Sweida are a political gesture. Evacuating the wounded to Israel and supplying weapons to a local militia means establishing a new on-the-ground relationship, opening a direct channel with one of the country’s most historically autonomous and strategic communities.
The Druze, a religious minority often marginalized but geographically vital, now find themselves both pawn and target. On one side, they are seen by Damascus as potential separatists. On the other, they are courted by Israel for anti-Iranian and anti-regime purposes. Meanwhile, the Syrian provisional government struggles to reassert territorial cohesion as foreign actors continue to erode its already fragile sovereignty.
The visible return of Russia and Israel’s growing activism in historically marginal areas reveal a new phase: a geopolitical contest for control over post-Assad Syria.
Once again, Syria doesn’t choose. Syria is chosen. And in this ruthless game, local communities like the Druze risk being instrumentalized, used, and ultimately abandoned. The flags change, but the logic remains the same. Moscow and Tel Aviv are laying the groundwork.
Meanwhile, gunfire echoes in Sweida, jets take off from Tartus, and Damascus remains still.
In the worrying silence of the international community, the world’s attention shifts from one global crisis to another.
